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Constitutional Civil Law
by Albert Sidney Johnson*
The 1996 survey period was a reasonably quiet year for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in terms of dramatic
developments in civil constitutional law. The most significant labor of
the court of appeals was directed toward accommodation of developing
law in the United States Supreme Court surrounding the application of
evidentiary sufficiency standards to qualified immunity inquiries.1 The
Eleventh Circuit continued its resolve against exercising pendent
appellate jurisdiction in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's directive
in Swint v. Chamber County Commission.2 The court of appeals had
occasion to consider, in three separate contexts,8 the municipal final
policymaker issue in advance of the Supreme Court's pending opinion."
Although the Eleventh Circuit continues to hold fast against any
proposed erosions of its holding on the availability of substantive due
process relief,5 it continues to be given opportunities to recede from that
position.8 As the court of appeals finds its way toward stronger

* Partner in the firm of Johnson & Montgomery, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1956); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1959).
1. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151
(1995).
2. 514 U.S. 35 (1995). Historically, the Eleventh Circuit has liberally exercised the
concept of pendent appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals of government entities and
official capacity defendants along with appeals from denials of qualified immunity. The
Supreme Court found this practice to be beyond the appellate authority of a court of
appeals.
3. See Riley v. Newton, 94 F.3d 632 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 955 (1997);
McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir.), cert.grantedsub nom. McMillian v. Monroe
County, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 1996).
4. Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 67 F.3d 1174 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. grantedsub nom.
Bryan County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Brown, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996).
5. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. McKinney
v. Osceola County Bd. of Comm'rs, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
6. Bell v. City of Demopolis, 86 F.3d 191 (11th Cir. 1996); C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383
(11th Cir. 1996).
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consensus in the civil constitutional arena, the Supreme Court's activity
on the subject prevents the court of appeals from becoming clearly
focused.
I.

A.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Immunity

1. Qualified Immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.7
The Eleventh Circuit uses a two-step analysis to determine whether
qualified immunity is available. First, the defendant must show that he
acted within the scope of his discretionary authority." Once the
defendant has made such a showing, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated the plaintiff's clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights.' A government official acts within his discretionary authority if the actions were "[11 undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties and [2] within the scope of his authority. 10
The majority of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit under the
qualified immunity doctrine continue to focus on a determination of
whether the plaintiff has shown that a defendant's conduct violated
clearly established law. In Anderson v. Creighton," the Supreme Court
determined that the constitutional right alleged to be violated must be
sufficiently established to inform the official that his conduct violated
the law when viewed in light of the information available to a reasonable
official. 2 The Court in Anderson established that the viability of an
"objectively reasonable" standard in preserving immunity depended on
the "level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be
identified." 3 The Anderson rule has been expressed by the Eleventh
Circuit as follows: "[Flor qualified immunity to be surrendered, preexisting law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow

7. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
8. Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994); Ziegler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d
847, 849 (11th Cir. 1983).
9. Doe, 38 F.3d at 1565; Ziegler, 716 F.2d at 849.
10. Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558,1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651
F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).
11. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
12. Id. at 641-42.
13. Id. at 639.
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or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,
reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates
14
federal law in the circumstances."
2. Qualified Immunity Sustained. In Heggs v. Grant," the
Eleventh Circuit sustained qualified immunity for a police chief when it
was not clearly established that the policies, procedures, and precautions
instituted to prevent inmate suicide were insufficient to protect the
inmate from any known suicidal tendencies. 6 Similarly, a shift
supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity when he knew the inmate;
had prior dealings with her; placed her in a cell from which blankets,
mattress had been removed; and checked on her every fifteen
sheets, and
17
minutes.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Suissa v. Fulton County, 8 sustained a grant
of qualified immunity on a finding that the law has not clearly
established that an unsuccessful attempt to influence speech violates the
First Amendment.' 9
In Johnson v. Clifton,2" police officers who testified against the chief
of police before a grand jury were disciplined following an internal
investigation of their own conduct.2 ' Because the officers claimed that
the discipline was in retaliation for exercising their free speech rights by
testifying before the grand jury, the court of appeals pointed out that a
balancing test must be conducted to determine whether the officer was
justified in disciplining the employees.' The Eleventh Circuit upheld
qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that the
police chief could not have taken the disciplinary action indicated by the
internal affairs investigation before he knew about the allegedly
protected speech.2'

14.
15.

Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
73 F.3d 317 (11th Cir. 1996).

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 320.
74 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 270 (stating that the facts of speech retaliation cases involved retaliation

after speech occurred, and thus were not "'materially similar' to unsuccessful attempts to
prevent or influence protected speech").

20. 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996).
21. 74 F.3d at 1092.
22. Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers,
462 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)). See also Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.

1989) (applying Pickering test).
23. 74 F.3d at 1093.
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Qualified immunity was also sustained in 71nney v. Shores,' because
neither plaintiffs' substantive due process claim nor procedural due
process claim supported violations of clearly established law. 5
Plaintiffs' claims were based on the sheriff's seizure of their mobile home
on behalf of their landlord."'
In a case in which deputized employees were discharged from
employment by an elected county tax collector for supporting the
collector's opponent, the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity to
the tax collector because there was no clearly established law which
warned the collector that terminating the employees for political reasons
violated any rights under the First Amendment.
in Cofield v. Randolph County Commission," which arose from
repossession of an automobile, qualified immunity was granted to a
deputy sheriff because it was not clearly established that repossession
under the existing facts was wrongful."
Foy v. Holston'° presented a convoluted state of facts involving
placement of children in foster care. The Eleventh Circuit upheld
qualified immunity against claims of government employees' hostility
toward plaintiffs' religious community and contentions of discriminatory
intent,"' because "the Supreme Court has not instructed us to drop
qualified immunity (with its test of objective reasonableness) from cases
82
in which discriminatory intent is an element of the underlying tort."
3. Qualified Immunity Denied. Notwithstanding the Eleventh
Circuit's substantial findings in support of the qualified immunity
defense, the following cases illustrate the circumstances in which

24.

77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996).

25. Id. at 381-82.
26.

Id. at 379-80.

27. Beauregard v. Olson, 84 F.3d 1402, 1404-05 (11th Cir. 1996). The same result
occurred in Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 1996), which involved employees
discharged by an elected county tax appraiser. Noting a split in the circuits about the
meaning of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980),

the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was not clearly established at the time the appraiser
discharged the employees that their dismissal for political reasons violated their First

Amendment rights. 86 F.3d at 1093-94. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit followed
Beauregardas a binding precedent. Id. at 1094.
28. 90 F.3d 468 (11th Cir. 1996).
29. Id. at 471.
30. 94 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir. 1996).
31. Id. at 1537.
32. Id. at 1533-34 (noting comparison with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,645-46
(1987), which stated that the general principle of qualified immunity should be applied
.across the board").
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qualified immunity may be denied. In Dolihite v. Maughon,88 the
Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity to a social worker who was
aware of an adolescent's suicidal threats and past behavior but had
failed to notify psychiatrists at the hospital to continue protective
In Cooper v. Smith," the Eleventh Circuit denied a
measures."
sheriff qualified immunity and held it was clearly established that a
sheriff violated a public employee's free speech rights by taking adverse
action against the employee because of the employee's cooperation with
a law enforcement investigation involving the sheriff.Es
Of an entirely different nature is the case of Anderson v. District
Board of Trustees,3 7 which illustrates the difficulties that occur when
counsel become too embroiled in their own fight to remember that an
independent decision-making body is also involved. Plaintiff filed a
typical shotgun pleading, asserting six claims arising out of his
termination by the college." Rather than filing a motion for more
definite statement, the defendant answered in kind.8 ' Unable to sort
out the pleadings and massive discovery, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's denial of qualified immunity without prejudice to the
defendant's right to resubmit the issue once the parties appropriately
joined issue on their claims and defenses.'
4. Genuine Issues of Material Fact. The place and function of the
fact-finding process continues to evolve in the Eleventh Circuit as the
court of appeals finds opportunity to apply Johnson v. Jones4' and
42 In Johnson, the Supreme Court returned to
Behrens v. Pelletier.
Mitchell v. Forsyth" to reconsider the proposition that a claim of
immunity by a governmental defendant is conceptually distinct from the
merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated."
Thus, a defendant who is entitled to invoke the qualified immunity
defense may not appeal a district court's denial of immunity insofar as
33. 74 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 1996).
34. Id. at 1042-43 (citing Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990), as the clearly
established law governing the claim).
35. 89 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 1996) (growing out of the same investigation that gave rise
to Mastroianni v. Bowen, 74 F.3d 236 (11th Cir. 1996)).
36. Id. at 765.
37. 77 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996).
38. Id. at 366.
39. Id. at 367.
40. Id. at 368.
41. 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995).
42. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).

43. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
44. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2157.
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the order determines whether the pretrial record sets forth a "genuine"
issue of fact."
Following its established construction of Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the appeal in Mastroianni v. Bowers," in which the district
court found that arresting the plaintiff without probable cause violated
clearly established law and that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether the defendants were guilty of the conduct alleged to
The court of appeals adhered to its earlier
constitute the violation.'
applications of Johnson and explained that when the district court finds
that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the conduct alleged
to have violated clearly established law, the court of appeals is without
appellate jurisdiction.'
Closely following the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Mastroianni v.
Bowers, the United States Supreme Court decided Behrens v. Pelletier,49 in which the Supreme Court clarified its intent in the decision in
Johnson. Pointing out that denial of summary judgment often includes
a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, the
Supreme Court said that Johnson does not mean that every such denial
is nonappeaable."0 If the issue in the trial court's determination of the
sufficiency of evidence is whether the evidence could support a finding
that particular conduct occurred, the question decided is not truly
separable from the plaintiff's claim and, hence, there is no appealable
final decision."1 Summary judgment determinations are appealable
concerning an abstract issue of law relating
when they resolve a dispute
52
to qualified immunity.
The Eleventh Circuit anticipated Behrens in Dolihite v. Maughon"
and Johnson v. Clifton." Dolihite involved an extremely complex
factual situation in which several mental health professionals and
administrators worked for or under contract with a state department of

45. Id. at 2158. The Johnson rationale was applied in the following cases during the
1995 survey period: Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1826 (1996); Babb v. Lake City Community College, 66 F.3d 270 (11th Cir. 1995);
and Ratliffv. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338 (11th Cir. 1995).
46. 74 F.3d 236 (11th Cir. 1996) (growing out of the same investigation giving rise to
Cooper v. Smith, 89 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 1996)).
47. Id. at 238.
48.

Id.

49. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
50. Id. at 842.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. 74 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996).
54. 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996).
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mental health and mental retardation." Relying on Youngberg v.
Romeo' and Greason v. Kemp,57 the district court denied qualified
In reviewing the district
immunity to all individual defendants.'
court's judgment, the court of appeals noted that although genuine
issues of material fact were raised as to the defendants' liability, their
appeals raised core qualified immunity issues within the issues of
fact. 69
In Johnson v. Clifton,' plaintiffs were terminated by a chief of police
under factual circumstances that were strongly disputed by the
parties.6 The court of appeals began its analysis of the jurisdictional
issues by observing that in Johnson the Supreme Court did not change
the well-established law of qualified immunity in the context of
summary judgment; it just elaborated on it."' The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that when faced with a motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, the district court must determine whether there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant
committed conduct that violated clearly established law." The court
stated that the inquiry can be broken down into two parts. "First, what
was the official's conduct, based on the pleadings, depositions, and
affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party? Second, could a reasonable public official have believed that such
conduct was lawful based on clearly established law?" 4 The resolution
of the second issue constitutes a final, collateral, and therefore appealable order."

55. Dolihite, 74 F.3d at 1033.
56. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that persons subjected to involuntary civil commitment
are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish and liability may be imposed only
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible
actually did not base the decision on such a judgment).
57. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that officials responsible for the care of
prison inmates are liable if they are put on notice of an inmate's suicidal tendencies and
fail to take reasonable precautions to prevent that suicide). The court cited Waldrop v.
Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989), for the same proposition. 891 F.2d at 835-36.
58. Dolihite, 74 F.3d at 1040.
59. Id. at 1033-35 n.3.
60. 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996).
61. 74 F.3d at 1089-90.
62. Id. at 1091.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985)).
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In Cottrell v. Caldwell," the Eleventh Circuit first applied the
Supreme Court's ruling in Behrens.67 Cottrell involved positional
asphyxiation of an arrestee in a police vehicle." Finding that its
earlier decisions69 were in alignment with Behrens, the court held that
"interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over legal issues involved in a
qualified immunity question exists even when the district court denied
the summary judgment 'motion with the unadorned statement that
"[m]aterial issues of fact remain as to [the defendant] on the [federal
question] claim."' 7 The court also noted its contrary holdings in
Mastroianni u. Bowers"' and Babb v. Lake City Community College, 2
stating that those cases preceded Behrens and cannot be reconciled with
3
it.

7

The court of appeals expanded its Johnson-Behrens application in
McMillian v. Johnson.4 Plaintiff's murder conviction was reversed on
appeal, after which he brought a civil rights action against the sheriff,
district attorney's investigator, and state bureau of investigation agent
most responsible for his conviction." Following denial of qualified
immunity defenses by the district court, the court of appeals considered
three issues about which there existed genuine issues of material fact.
The first issue focused on whether the pretrial detention of the plaintiff
on death row violated clearly established law.76 The second issue
considered whether the defendants suppressed exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.77 The third issue concerned coercion of false
testimony.7 The court of appeals treated differently the district court's
fact-finding and the analysis of each issue.
First, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that pretrial detention on death
row for purposes of punishment constituted a violation of clearly

66. 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996).
67. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
68. 85 F.3d at 1483.
69. Id. at 1486 (citing Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 185 (1996); Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51
(1996); Haney v. Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1826
(1996)).
70. Id. at 1484-85 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Behrens, 116 S.
Ct. at 838).
71. 74 F.3d 236 (11th Cir. 1996).
72. 66 F.3d 170 (11th Cir. 1995).
73. 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996).
74. 88 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1996).
75. Id. at 1558-59.
76. Id. at 1559.
77. Id. at 1560.
78. Id. at 1561.
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established law on due process grounds.79 Whether the purpose of such
detention was for punishment and intimidation, as contended by
plaintiff," or for purposes of security and safekeeping of plaintiff, as
contended by defendants,"1 were issues of material fact from which a
jury could determine that punishment was the purpose of death row
detention."2 Accordingly, qualified immunity was denied."
The second issue considered was whether the alleged suppression of
exculpatory evidence violated clearly established law."I Under the
principles of Brady v. Maryland,5 the court found that plaintiff stated
a claim of constitutional violation." The case was remanded to the
district court for a determination of materiality of the suppressed
evidence as to defendant's knowledge of how the totality of the evidence
would play out at trial. 87
In its consideration of the issue involving coercion of false testimony,
the court resorted to its own fact-finding prerogative," concluding that
the coerced individual was not a potential defense witness and that
defendants did not violate plaintiff's clearly established rights in
allegedly threatening the witness.o Accordingly, defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity,"°

79. Id. at 1564 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), and Hamm v. DeKalb
County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986)).
80. Id. at 1559.
81. Id. at 1559-60.
82. Id. at 1566.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the
prosecution).
86. McMillian, 88 F.3d at 1567-70.
87. Id. at 1570.
88. Id. at 1571. Even when the core qualified immunity issue is raised, the court of
appeals is not required to make its own determination of facts and may decline to review
the district court's determination of the facts for purposes of summary judgment. It has
discretion to accept the district court's findings if they are adequate. That approach is
normally followed by the Eleventh Circuit, but as to this issue an exception was made
because the court determined that the district court's finding as to the content of a
statement by the witness appeared to be based entirely on a misreading of the record. Id.
See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F,3d 1087
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996).
89. McMillian, 88 F.3d at 1571.
90. Id.
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5. Deliberate Indifference. Lack of attention to medical needs,
prisoner suicides, and inmate-on-inmate violence constitute a large
portion of cases involving qualified immunity and claims of deliberate
indifference. Cases involving these issues are most likely to be analyzed
under Farmer v. Brennan,91 in which a subjective element is present
along with an objective element. On the other hand, cases involving
failure to train or failure to supervise are more appropriately analyzed
under the objective standard of City of Canton v. Harris.'
In Williams v. Lee County," plaintiff's decedent committed himself
to a medical center for detoxification and treatment for drug abuse."
After he left the facility without authority, he was taken into custody
and ordered to be held at the county jail pending transfer to a treatment
facility. While in the jail, he was kept under constant observation for
two days and later moved to a single cell where he was monitored every
fifteen to twenty minutes. The decedent made self-threatening
statements to an officer, subsequent to which the officer concluded that
the statements were threats of self-harm."' Upon returning to the cell,
the officer found that the decedent had hanged himself." Resuscitation
efforts failed. Against claims of deliberate indifference based on
insufficient training and supervision, the Eleventh Circuit followed its
earlier rule that to establish deliberate indifference to a suicide risk, the
official must have notice of a strong likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility, of the particular decedent's suicidal tendencies? 7
Riley v. Newton" was a suit against a sheriffs investigator who
permitted a military police office to accompany him in a drug investigation." In the course of an arrest, the military police officer accidentally

91. 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994) (holding that the appropriate test for "deliberate
indifference" is the same as that of "subjective recklessness" as used in the criminal
law-whether the official has consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.
Thus, the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference).
92. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
93. 78 F.3d 491 (11th Cir. 1996).
94. Id. at 492.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id. (citing Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535 (11th Cir. 1994), and
observing that the court of appeals had found less formal means of suicide prevention than
those appearing in this case to pass constitutional muster). See Belcher v. City of Foley,
30 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1994); Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1992).
98. 94 F.3d 632 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 955 (1997).
99. 94 F.3d at 634.
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shot and killed an arrestee.'0 ' The ensuing claim contended that the
sheriff had failed to properly train his personnel regarding the use of
In granting motion for
military personnel to enforce civil law.0'°
summary judgment, the court of appeals held that a claim for inadequate training exists only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.' 0' The failure to train must reflect a deliberate or
conscious choice and the deficiency must be closely related to the
ultimate injury.'0 3
Steele v. Shah'° presented circumstances in which a prison inmate
and his psychiatrist disagreed as to the prisoner's proper course of
treatment and the consequences likely to result therefrom.0 5 Establishing Waldrop v. Evans' ' and Greason v. Kemp 7 as standards of
comparison, the court held that on record facts, a jury would have been
entitled to find that the care afforded plaintiff was grossly inadequate
and that any reasonable person in the doctor's position would have
known that such care constituted deliberate indifference to plaintiff's
needs."0 '
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Stating a Claim. The Eleventh Circuit found an absence of
federal subject matter jurisdiction in Boatman v. Town of Oakland,'
where the issue was whether property owners should be issued a
certificate of occupancy for their manufactured home." 0 After the
property owners obtained a building permit and constructed the home,
the town's building inspector refused to perform a final inspection and
issue a certificate of occupancy on the grounds that the property owners
had constructed a mobile home in violation of the town's zoning

100. Id. at 635.
101. Id. at 638.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989)).

104. 87 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1996).
105. 1& at 1267.
106. 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989) (discontinuance of psychotropic medication
resulting in self-mutilation).
107. 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (discontinuance of psychotropic medication resulting
in suicide).
108. Steele, 87 F.3d at 1270.
109. 76 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1996).
110. Id. at 342-43.
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ordinance."1
Upon the property owners' concession that any relief
they sought in federal court could have been granted by the state circuit
court, the court found no federal constitutional claim in the case."
In McKusick v. City of Melbourne,"' plaintiff brought an action
against a city seeking declaratory judgment to invalidate a state court
injunction. The injunction required named parties and persons acting
in concert with them to maintain a buffer zone of thirty-six feet around
an abortion clinic. 14 Plaintiff entered the buffer zone and began to
read her Bible and pray.1 As a result, she was approached by a city
police officer who warned her that she was in violation of the injunction.
Thereafter, she refrained from violating the injunction because she
feared being arrested. Her complaint was based on allegations that the
city unconstitutionally enforced the injunction against her and other
third parties who were neither named parties in the state court action,
nor acting in concert with named parties.1
In response, the city
contended that its interests were not adverse to plaintiff's, and
therefore, the action sought an impermissible advisory opinion."' The
district court agreed and granted the city's motion to dismiss.'
The
court 9of appeals reversed, holding that under the terms of the injunc11
tion,
[t]he development and implementation of an administrative enforcement procedure, going beyond the terms of the injunction itself, leading
to the arrest of all anti-abortion protesters found within the buffer
zone, including persons not named in the injunction nor shown by

probable cause to be acting in concert with named parties, would
amount to a cognizable policy choice."

111. Id.
112. Id. at 346.
113. 96 F.3d 478 (11th Cir. 1996).
114. Id. at 481. The Supreme Court had previously upheld the injunction as a
permissible content-neutral restriction on speech in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512
U.S. 753 (1994). The Eleventh Circuit had previously held the injunction to be a viewpointbased restriction on speech in Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated,
41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1994).
115. 96 F.3d at 481.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 482.
118. Id.
119. Id. The injunction stated that "law enforcement authorities, pursuant to the
protective provisions of the court's order, are authorized to arrest those persons who appear
to be in willful and intentional disobedience of this injunction." I& (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 484.
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Accordingly, the plaintiff had stated a claim against the city.121
2. Ripeness. The ripeness doctrine addresses constitutional and
prudential concerns that a claim does not constitute a "case" or
In the land use
"controversy" within the meaning of Article III."
prohibit the
Amendments
and
Fourteenth
the
Fifth
because
context,
asserting
a
plaintiff
taking of property without just compensation,
has
been
denied
that
he
final
decision
obtain
a
must
regulatory takings
the
takings
claim
state court remedies for inverse condemnation before
for
the
is
required
is ripe."' The finality prong of the ripeness inquiry
development
of
permitted
and
extent
nature
"'the
court to determine
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport
to limit [development].'"" u
The ripeness doctrine was applied in Strickland v.Alderman,"m
where plaintiff advanced the futility exception in the denial of a building
permit.'26 Plaintiff sought to bring himself within the futility exception by relying on casual conversations in which city officials had stated
that no building permits would be issued on the property in question.'" Until the plaintiff makes application for or otherwise formally
requests permits and is rejected, the action of the city is not final."m
Informal inquiries are insufficient to invoke the futility exception."m

121. Id. at 483 (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(holding that a private party may obtain relief against a municipality under Section 1983

when the allegedly unconstitutional municipal action implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers, or when the alleged constitutional violation results from municipal custom)
and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (finding that the presence of a

municipal policy or custom is essential, because municipal liability under section 1983 can
attach only when a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among
various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with
respect to the subject matter in question)).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I1, cl. 1.
123. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1041 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
124. 505 U.S. at 1011 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477
U.S. 340, 351 (1986)).
125. 74 F.3d 260 (11th Cir. 1996).
126. 1& at 263.
127. Id. at 265.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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In Bickerstaff Clay Products, Inc. v. Harris County,"" a brick
manufacturer owned property as mineral reserves for future mining.""'
Incident to an attempt to rezone the property to a mining classification,
the county's governing authority rezoned the property to residential
use.12 The property owner's Fifth Amendment taking claim was not
ripe" because state law provided a compensatory remedy under the
eminent domain' 3 and due process provisions.3 5 of the state constitution. Nevertheless, the court of appeals remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of compensation on the temporary
taking claim because the residential zoning was determined to be a
completed
but unconstitutional act, and therefore, ripe for consider3
ation.'
In New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County,"" a property owner's
taking claim centered around its contention that the county had
physically occupied the property and deprived the owner of its right to
exclude others."
The contention was predicated on the county's
rezoning of property from a residential classification to private airport
use. 9 Although "a permanent physical occupation of private property
by the state constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be
compensated,""4 the leasing of the property by the county to a tenant
for the purpose of operating an airport does not constitute the physical
occupation which would authorize compensation without first seeking
compensation in the state courts.'
II.

A.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Municipal Liability

1. Policy or Custom. In Riley v. Newton,'42 the court of appeals
held that use of a military police officer to accompany a sheriff's

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

89 F.3d 1481 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1483.
Id. at 1484.
Id. at 1490.
Id. at 1491 (citing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1).
Id. (citing GA. CoNST. art. 1, § 3, para. 1).

136. Id.
137. 95 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996).
138. Id. at 1087.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 1088 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

141. Id. at 1088.89.
142. 94 F.3d 632 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 955 (1997).
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investigator during a drug investigation, or lack of oversight of the
military officer's choice of weapon, could not establish the existence of a
policy or custom to use the military to enforce the law in violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act 4 ' or any other policy or custom that caused the
military officer to accidentally shoot an arrestee.'
2. Final Polcymaker. A municipality may be held liable for a
single act or decision of a municipal official with final policymaking
In Hill v. Clifton,'
authority in the area of the act or decision."
a terminated police officer brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging gender discrimination, equal protection violations, and
retaliation. 47 The termination was recommended by the police chief
and approved by the city manager.'" The police chief was not the
final policymaker, and there was no evidence that the city manager
approved the termination based on the same allegedly discriminatory
reasons that supported the, recommendation. 4 9 Accordingly, the
municipality had no liability under the "final policymaker" theory."W
In McMillian v. Johnson,' the issue was whether an Alabama
sheriff had final policymaking authority for a county.152 The court of
appeals noted that the Supreme Court has provided limited guidance for
determining whether an official has final policymaking authority with
respect to a particular action, but the majority opinion in Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District" provides several principles for guidance.'" First, state law determines whether a particular official has
final policymaking authority.'5 5 Second, "the authority to make
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
144. 94 F.3d at 637.
145. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
146. 74 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996). This is a companion
case to Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087 (11th Cir. 1996), also reviewed herein.
147. 74 F.3d at 1151.
148. Id. at 1152.
149. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988) (holding that a city
may be held responsible where the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's
decision and the basis for it)).
150. Id.
151. 88 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.grantedsub nom. McMillian v. Monroe County,
117 S. Ct. 554 (1997). This McMillian case is a companion to McMillian v. Johnson, 88
F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1996), also reviewed herein.
152. 88 F.3d at 1576.
153. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
154. 88 F.3d at 1577.
155. Id. "Identifying final policymakers may be a difficult task, but state law always
should direct 'us to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or
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municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy"
Third, "the alleged policymaker must have final policymaking authority
with respect to the specific action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional or statutory violation.""
The application of these
guidelines led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that, in Alabama, a
sheriff was not a final policymaker for the county so as to make a county
liable in the area of law enforcement."5
B. FirstAmendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'
1. Government Regulation Impacting Speech. The Constitution
grants less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
safeguarded forms of expression.'
The Supreme Court has established a four-part test to determine the constitutionality of restrictions
on commercial speech: (1) the speech must concern a lawful activity and
not be misleading; (2) the government must prove that it has a
substantial interest in its stated basis for the statute; (3) the restriction
must directly advance the government's interest; and (4) the restriction
must be narrowly drawn to avoid unduly burdening speech.""'
In Sciarrino v. City of Key West,"5 the Eleventh Circuit applied the
CentralHudson four-part test to a city ordinance which was designed to
control activities of barkers for retail establishments by limiting the
location of off-premises solicitation, limiting the number of off-premises
canvassers, and establishing a permitting system for persons who sought

setting policy in any given area of a local government's business.'" Id. (quoting City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988)).
156. Id. (quoting Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 127).
157. Id. at 1577-78.

158. Id. at 1582. The court found that under Alabama law, Ala. Code § 36-22-3(4)
(1991), law enforcement authority is assigned to sheriffs, but not to counties. Thus,
McMillian is distinguished from Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989), in

which the court found that the sheriff was a final county policymaker in the area of hiring,
firing, and jail administration.

159. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
160. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
161. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 550, 566
(1980).

162. 83 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 768 (1997).
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to engage in off-premises soliciting on publicly owned land.'" The city
conceded that the activity was not misleading and concerned lawful
The court of appeals found that the city's asserted interest
activity.'
in controlling solicitation to prevent the harassment of pedestrians by
barkers, reducing pedestrian traffic, and reducing litter, stated a
The
substantial interest in the problems sought to be corrected.'
ordinance directly advanced the city's interest in reducing pedestrian
congestion and harassment and went no further than necessary to
achieve the result sought."
In analyzing a facial attack on Florida's laws regulating lobbying
activities, 7 the court of appeals followed the guidelines of United
e where the Supreme Court upheld the Federal
States v. Harris,"
Regulation of Lobbying Act" against a First Amendment challenge.170 The court of appeals expressed concern about the level of
constitutional scrutiny to be applied to the analysis and rejected the
contention that the regulations must be reviewed on the basis of strict
scrutiny.7 1 The challengers conceded that the state had articulated
legitimate interests in advancing the regulations but failed to show that
of the applications of the law would fail to further
a substantial fraction
72
those interests.

In Smith v. Avino," 3 the court of appeals held that when a curfew
is imposed as an emergency measure in response to a natural disas7 4 the scope of review of constitutional challenges to the curfew is
ter,"
limited to a determination of whether the action was taken in good faith
that the restricand whether there is some factual basis for a decision
75
tion imposed was necessary to maintain order.1

163. 83 F.3d at 366.
164. Id. at 367.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 369-70 (holding that the city is not required to employ the least restrictive
means imaginable).
167. FLA. STATS. ANN. §§ 11.045, 112.3215 (West 1997). The specific issues in this case
related to disclosure requirements and contingent fee engagements.
168. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
169. 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1994).
170. Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 459 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 516 (1996).
171. FloridaLeague, 87 F.3d at 460.
172. Id. at 460-61.
173. 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996).
174. Id. at 107 (Hurricane Andrew).
175. Id. at 109 (citing United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) (civil
unrest after a racial incident) and Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F. Supp. 193 (D.V.I. 1989)
(ravages of Hurricane Hugo)).
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Nationalist Mouement v. City of Cumming7 ' made another appearance before the Eleventh Circuit on the question of restrictions in parade
permits. 7 A city ordinance banning Saturday morning parades was
a reasonable time, manner, and place regulation and did not violate the
First Amendment. 17' The ordinance furthered a significant government interest in controlling traffic, was narrowly tailored because it
prohibited parades only when traffic was heaviest and provided ample
alternative channels of communication, such as leafleting, distributing
pamphlets, and holding parades during other times. 79
In International Caucus of Labor Committees v. City of Montgomery,se the Eleventh Circuit considered a policy of the City of Montgomery, Alabama that completely banned any tables on all sidewalks. The
Caucus sought to use public sidewalks to set up folding card tables for
the purpose of distributing political literature."8 ' The court of appeals
rejected the First Amendment attack, holding that the prohibition
against placing any table on a public sidewalk, for whatever purpose,
does not implicate the First Amendment.8 2
2. Public Employment. A governmental employer's restrictions or
actions violate the First Amendment if the employee was sanctioned for
speaking out on a matter of public concern in his role as a citizen and
if the employee's interest in the speech is not outweighed by the
employer's interest in providing orderly and efficient government
services." s The "public concern" element is determined on a case-bycase basis by determining whether the content, form, and context of the
speech indicate that the speech was a matter of general public concern. 184

176. 92 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 688 (1997).
177. See Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885 (11th Cir.), vacated,
921 F.2d 1125 (11th Cir. 1990), originalopinion reinstated,934 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991),
aff'd on different issue, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
178.

92 F.3d at 1139.

179. Id. at 1139-40.
180. 87 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 1996).
181. Id. at 1276.
182.

Id. The court of appeals noted the lack of authority on the precise question, the

inappropriateness of the newsrack cases to the issue of folding tables, and the nondiscriminatory nature of the ban. Id. The dissent argued that the district court was correct in
applying the time, place, and manner test under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989), and would focus on the communication rather than the table. Id. at 1282
(Anderson, J., dissenting).

183. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
184. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
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Three cases decided during the survey period illustrated the difficulty
of establishing standards of analysis and review which would generally
In Thornquest v. King,' college policy gave
apply in such cases.l'
the president the authority to manage dissent and demonstrations,
including the authority to delineate types of acceptable and unacceptable
dissent.""7 In furtherance of the policy, the college administration
created a designated demonstration area which plaintiffs disregarded in
the conduct of their protests and demonstrations about certain college
issues. The demonstrations were conducted at a performance center
which was the focus of protests.'" Against plaintiffs' claims that the
policy was unconstitutional facially and as applied to them, the Eleventh
Circuit found the record insufficient to permit a summary judgment
determination as to such questions as (1) whether the performance
center was a public forum, and if so, whether the college's policies were
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest, (2) whether the
policies were reasonable, and (3) whether plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the policies.' 9
In Beauregard v. Olson,"9 a tax collector discharged deputized
employees for supporting the collector's opponent.' 9' Plaintiffs' job
duties were ministerial and the tax collector fired them for political
reasons. This action posed the question whether the employees had a
general First Amendment right not to be fired for political patronage
reasons." The court of appeals reviewed the application of Elrod v.
Burns" and Branti v. Finkel,'94 noting that the First Amendment
right not to be fired for patronage reasons is determined on a standard
and sweeping language certain to create vast
"framed in 1vague
95
uncertainty.

In Mize v. Jefferson City Board of Education," the Eleventh Circuit
reiterated the four-part Bryson'97 test for deciding a claim of First
185. Cooper v. Smith, 89 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 1996); Beauregard v. Olson, 84 F.3d 1402
(11th Cir. 1996); Thornquest v. King, 82 F.3d 1001 (11th Cir. 1996).
186. 82 F.3d 1001 (11th Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 1004.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1004-05.
190. 84 F.3d 1402 (11th Cir. 1996).
191. Id. at 1403.
192. Id.
193. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
194. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
195. Beauregard, 84 F.3d at 1405 (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 522 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
196. 93 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 1996).
197. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Amendment retaliatory discharge.1 In those cases, the court looks to
(1) whether the employee's speech involves a matter of public concern,
(2) whether the employee's interest in speaking outweighs the government's legitimate interests in efficient public service, (3) whether the
speech played a substantial part in the government's challenged
employment decision, and (4) whether the government would have made
the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct.'" When there is no causation between the employee's speech
and the adverse employment action, the employee's claim of retaliatory
discharge fails, and it is unnecessary to consider the other three
elements.2'
In Mize, the discharged employee failed to present
sxifficient evidence from which
a jury could find causation between the
°
speech and the discharge.
3. Free Exercise Clause. The Eleventh Circuit considered the
impact of prison regulations on the Free Exercise Clause2' in two
cases during the survey period.2s0 In Lawson v. Singletary,m state
prisoners brought a class action challenging refusal of prison officials to
permit inmates of the Hebrew Israelite faith to receive religious
literature.0 5 In upholding the restrictive regulations,"' the court of
appeals held that prison inmates retain only such First Amendment
rights as are not inconsistent with their status as prisoners, and there
is no per se bar to censorship of prisoners' incoming mail.'o7 The same
deference is accorded the judgment of prison officials with respect to
security and other penological concerns, whether the challenge involves
free speech or exercise of religion.2 s

198.

93 F.3d at 742.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 745.
202. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;" U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
203. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996); Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d
502 (11th Cir. 1996).
204. 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996).
205. Id. at 504. Prison officials claimed that the Hebrew Israelite texts at issue
contained "highly-charged, anti-white, racism and thus presented a serious threat to
security and order within [the] prisons." Id.
206. Id at 513.
207. 1& at 509.
208. Id. at 509-10.
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Similarly, in Harris v. Chapman,2 a prison hair length rule met
legitimate penological interests and did not violate a Rastafarian
inmate's free exercise rights.210
4. Ballot Access. In Chandler v. Miller,11 plaintiffs challenged
a state statute2 " requiring drug testing for political candidates and
nominees for state office.2 u Under the statute, anyone who declined
to take the test or who tested positive was basically barred from holding
office.214 The statutory scheme was attacked on First Amendment
grounds, 215 alleging that the refusal of the plaintiffs to submit to drug
testing was a form of protected expression. 21' Relying on United States
v. O'Brien2 1 in upholding the statute, the court of appeals held that
it is generally in the power of the state to prescribe qualifications for
elected officials where the statute furthers a substantial governmental
interest, the government's underlying purpose is not suppression of free
expression, and the statute is no more restrictive of expression than is
necessary.21 5
Duke v. Massey21 9 made a further appearance before the Eleventh
Circuit 22 in an on-going constitutional challenge to a state statute2 1
which designated that state and party officials make up the presidential
primary ballot.22 2 Duke challenged the committee's decision to delete

209. 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996).
210. Id. at 503.
211. 73 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 38 (1996). The Supreme Court
has reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in this case since the time this Article
was written. See 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
212.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-140 (1993).

213. 73 F.3d at 1544.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1544, 1548.
217. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Burning of draft card in protest of Vietnam War is protected
form of communication under First Amendment).
218. Chandler,73 F.3d at 1548-49.
219. 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).
220. This case arose in 1992 contesting the deletion of presidential candidate David
Duke from the Georgia Presidential Primary Ballot. See Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526
(11th Cir. 1992) (request for temporary restraining order and permanent injunction denied;
intervention of chairperson of Republican Party affirmed); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399
(11th Cir. 1993) (holding that where a state empowers its officials to exclude presidential
aspirants from presidential primary ballot, the power exercised is attributable to the state
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
221. O.C.GA. § 21-2-193 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
222. Duke, 87 F.3d at 1230.
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him from the ballot.2 " Employing a standard of strict scrutiny, the
court of appeals announced a series of propositions upholding the
statute: Duke has a First Amendment right to express his political
beliefs free from state discrimination no matter how repugnant his
beliefs may be to others; he does not have a First Amendment right to
express his beliefs as a presidential candidate for the Republican Party;
the Republican Party has a First Amendment right to freedom of
association and an attendant right to identify those who constitute the
party based on political beliefs; Duke does not have the right to associate
with an unwilling partner; Duke's supporters do not have a First
Amendment right to associate with him as a Republican Party presidential candidate, but are not foreclosed from supporting him as an
independent candidate or as a third party candidate in the general
election; and the state has a compelling interest in protecting political
parties' right to define their membership.2 '
C.

FourthAmendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
1. Search. In Chandler v.Miller,22 the petitioners challenged a
state statute requiring drug testing for political candidates and nominees
for state office 27 on Fourth Amendment grounds.'
The court of
appeals concluded that the tests were Fourth Amendment searches, but
that special needs were at issue.'
The special needs issue was
whether unlawful drug use was fundamentally incompatible with high
state office.'
Balancing the state's special needs interest against the
plaintiffs' privacy interests, the court of appeals held that the intrusion

223. Id.

224. Id. at 1234.
225.
226.
227.
228.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
73 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997). See supra note 211.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-140 (1993).
73 F.3d at 1545.

229. Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
230. Id at 1546 (comparing the special needs of Von Raab that physical and ethical
demands on customs agents were so great as to render drug use totally incompatible with
the nature of the position).
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of the search was insufficient to constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 '
In Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education,'2 elementary
teachers twice strip searched two eight year old female students based
on accusations by a classmate that they had stolen money.2' Plaintiffs' stated a cause of action for a Fourth Amendment violation.'
The application of the Fourth Amendment to searches of public school
students is governed by New Jersey v. TL.O.,' and requires an
examination of such factors as the reasonable relationship between the
scope and the objectives of the search,' the intrusiveness of the
search in light of the age and sex of the students, 7 and the intrusiveness of the search in light of the nature of the alleged infraction.'
2. Seizure. 7Tnney v. Shores'"arose from the seizure by a deputy
sheriff of a mobile home for failure to pay rent.2' Action was instituted on due process grounds, both substantive and procedural.24 In
affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, 2 the court of
appeals underscored the requirement of Graham v. Connor," that the
specific prohibition of the Fourth Amendment be applied.2'
In Whiting v. Traylor,24 overzealous state marine patrol officers
engaged in a series of harassing acts against a boat owner, including

231. Id at 1547. But see id. at 1549-53 (Barkett, J., dissenting). ("I do not believe that
the suspicionless search in these circumstances serves any special governmental need
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, and, if it did, I believe that the candidates'
privacy interests outweigh the governmental interests when the factors of Von Raab are
properly considered"). Id. at 1549.
232. 95 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir.), vacated, No. 95-6243, 1996 WL 606638 (11th Cir. Oct.
16, 1996).
233. 95 F.3d at 1038.
234. Id. at 1039.
235. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
236. 95 F.3d at 1044.
237. Id. at 1047.
238. Id. at 1043.
239. 77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996).
240. Id. at 380.
241. Id. at 381.
242. Id. at 383.
243. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that where a particular Amendment provides
an "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of
government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive
due process,' must be the guide for analyzing the claim").
244. Tinney, 77 F.3d at 381.
245. 85 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 1996).
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arrests and citations.2' Some charges were nol-prossed. Others were
pursued until dismissed by a state court judge. In dismissing, the state
court found that defendants and the prosecuting attorney had harassed
plaintiff, either through gross incompetence or by intention.2 7 Upon
conclusion of all proceedings, plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 based upon the maintenance of a prosecution without probable
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In dismissing the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court concluded that any
Fourth Amendment claim based on plaintiff's surrender or arrest was
time barred.'
Relying on Albright v. Oliver,' and citing Justice
Ginsberg's concurring opinion in particular,2 " the court of appeals
recognized plaintiff's "continuing seizure" theory 1 and permitted
him
2
to wait to sue until the prosecution terminated in his favor.1
2
In Ortega v. Christian,
" the court of appeals reviewed the essential
elements for establishing probable cause for an arrest based on a tip
from a confidential informant.2' A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section
1983 claim.'
In determining whether an informant's tip rises to the
level of probable cause, a court must assess the totality of the circumstances, including the relevance of factors such as the informant's
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge; the corroboration of the
details of the informant's tip through independent police work; and
whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing
the same knowledge could have believed that probable cause existed to
make the arrest for the suspected crime." 6 An assessment of the
totality of circumstances in this arrest indicated a failure to corroborate
the details of available information to the extent that the arresting
officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest.2 5 The arrest in this
case led to a detention of the suspect for a period of five months,2' and
thus, engendered an analysis of the constitutional implications of false

246. Id. at 583.

247. Id.
248. Id.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

510 U.S. 266 (1994).
1d. at 276-81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Whiting, 85 F.3d at 584.
Id. at 586.
85 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1525 (citing Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1990)).

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1523-24.
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imprisonment." 9 A detention on the basis of a false arrest presents
a viable section 1983 action.' ° A false imprisonment claim under
section 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendments protection
against deprivations of liberty without due process of law and is
grounded28 in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
seizures. '
D.

Fifth Amendment
No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. 262

1. Self-Incrimination. A custodian of corporate records may not be
compelled to testify as to the location of documents not in her possession
However, there
when such testimony would be self-incriminating.'
is no Fifth Amendment privilege in favor of collective entities, such as
Accordingly, an agent of such an
corporations 6 4 or labor unions.'
entity may not refuse to produce documents of the entity even when
those documents will incriminate the entity or the agent producing the
documents.'
2. Taking. Takings cases continue in a regular flow through the
Eleventh Circuit, mostly under the Fourteenth Amendment incorpora-

259. Id. at 1526.
260. Id. (citing Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 1979)).
261. Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)). The holding is somewhat
confusing in that the language suggests that there is a separate Fourteenth Amendment

claim based on substantive due process, as well as a Fourth Amendment claim based on
the continuation of an unreasonable seizure which is made applicable to the state through

the Fourteenth Amendment.

The authorities cited in support of the Fourteenth

Amendment claim predate Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), holding where a

particular Amendment provides an "explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process' must be the guide for analyzing the claim."
Id. It would appear that the particularized Fourth Amendment basis for a false
imprisonment claim would be more appropriate than the generalized substantive due
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
262. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
263. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 87 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 1996).
264. Id. (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
265. Id. (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
266. Id
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tion doctrine. Four takings cases' claimed the court of appeals
attention during the survey period. However, Strickland v. Alderman,2' Bickerstaff Clay Products,Inc. v. Harris County," and New
Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County,270 were disposed of for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on ripeness grounds under the rubric of
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Williamson
271
Bank.

E. Eighth Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. To establish an Eighth
Amendment violation a prisoner must prove that an injury was caused
by an unnecessary and wanton infliction of painY3 In Harris v.
Chapman,274 a Rastafarian prisoner refused on religious grounds to
comply with a hair length regulation. Following orders to enforce the
hair length rule, several corrections officers forcibly removed plaintiff
The
from his cell and restrained him while his hair was cut.27
prisoner's Section 1983 complaint alleged that while his hair was being
cut, the corrections officers beat him and used racial slurs at him.2
In response to a jury award of five hundred dollars in punitive damages
against one officer, the district court granted judgment as a matter of
law. 7 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the core judicial
inquiry is whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.' 5

267. New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996); Corn v.

City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1996); Bickerstaff Clay Prods. v. Harris
County, 89 F.3d 1481 (11th Cir. 1996); Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260 (11th Cir.
1996).
268. 74 F.3d 260, 266 (11th Cir. 1996).

269. 89 F.3d 1481, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996).
270. 95 F.3d 1084, 1089 (11th Cir. 1996).
271. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).

272. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
273. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

320-21 (1986)).
274. 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996).

275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 502.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 505.
Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)).
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The absence of serious injury alone is insufficient to dismiss an Eighth
Amendment claim. 279
F

FourteenthAmendment
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'

1. Due Process. A public housing tenant was evicted from her
apartment and complained that she was not afforded a pre-eviction
hearing. 2s The record showed that her eviction was procured through
a state court eviction process. 2 However, the complaint focused on
the tenant's contention that she was not provided a hearing by the
Because the
housing authority pursuant to the housing statute.'
and because
court,
in
state
defense
tenant was entitled to present a
there was no reason to believe that the housing authority could better
determine whether she had paid her rent, the court of appeals held that
court proceeding provided her with all the process that she was
the state
4
2
due. 8

In Williams v. Fountain,"5 an inmate of a state prison was subjected
to discipline for fighting with another inmate.' Although no witnesses were offered by either side at a hearing, the imposition of the
discipline was substantially based on facts furnished by a confidential
informant. 287 The inmate raised two procedural due process issues: (1)
whether he was entitled to have the credibility of the informant
evaluated, and (2) whether there should have been any record evidence
of his violation of rules.' The court of appeals held that there was no

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Colvin v. Housing Auth. of Sarasota, 71 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 865.
Id. at 866.
Id.
77 F.3d 372 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 367 (1996).
77 F.3d at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id.
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due process deprivation on either the credibility evaluation claim' or
the corroboration of evidence claim.'
C. B. v. Driscoll' involved school discipline issues raised by two
students complaining of two separate incidents. 2 One student was
suspended for nine days for fighting, screaming obscenities, and
assaulting faculty members. The other was suspended for nine days for
possessing a look-alike illegal substance.' Both alleged denial of both
substantive and procedural due process.'
The substantive due
process claims contended that the suspension caused injury of a shocking
and abusive nature and that the disciplinarian was biased in the
matter.25 Relying on McKinney v. Pate,' the court of appeals held
that the right to attend a public school is a state-created, rather than a
findamental, right for the purposes of substantive due process.'
Accordingly, the right to avoid school suspension may be abridged as
long as proper procedural protections are afforded.2 1
The Fourteenth Amendment is implicated in school suspension
2
decisions when a state provides an entitlement to a public education. 9
However, when a student is suspended for fewer than ten days, the
process provided need consist only of oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.s'
Thus, when students are removed from school for creating a disturbance,
a tentative decision to continue to suspend the students for some days
may be made before a hearing, as long as the disciplinarian holds a

289. Id. at 375. "If the sanctions imposed by the disciplinary committee have a
sufficient evidentiary basis independent of any unreliable information obtained from
confidential informants, the procedural due process concerns would be allayed." Id. (citing
Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The inquiry into the reliability
of informers may be diminished (or even satisfied) where there is corroborating physical
evidence of the information provided")).
290. 77 F.3d at 375. "A minimum requirement of due process is that conclusions of
prison disciplinary bodies be 'supported by some evidence in the record.'" Id. (quoting
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985)). In Williams, the
corroborating evidence was the inmate's admission that he engaged in a fight. 77 F.3d at
375.
291. 82 F.3d 383 (11th Cir. 1996).
292. Id. at 385.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 386.
295. Id.
296. 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 848 (1995).
297. C.B., 82 F.3d at 387.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 386 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975)).
300. Id.
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prompt hearing at which the preliminary decision to suspend can be
reversed. 80'
The procedural due process claim under review in Bell v. City of
Demopolis,$'2 an employment discrimination action, involved discipline
and reprimand, indefinite suspension, termination, review by a police
committee, and finally, review by the city council.' a The court of
appeals held that when there is available a satisfactory state means by
which the plaintiff can seek redress for any procedural due process
deprivation, then there is no cognizable procedural due process
claim.3 °
III.

CONCLUSION

During 1996, the Eleventh Circuit continued to make adjustments in
its docket management process. These efforts arise from two sources:
the Supreme Court's substantial bar to the use of pendent appellate
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's continued refinement of the
standard and application of evidentiary sufficiency in qualified immunity
consideration. The Supreme Court's ripple effect on the Eleventh Circuit
is likely to continue when the final policymaker decision comes down,
probably in the 1997 survey period. More substantive constitutional
issues appear to have achieved a measure of stability without any
pending Supreme Court cases threatening to disrupt or redirect the
Eleventh Circuit's work in the near future.

301. Id. at 387 (citing Sweet v. Childs, 618 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1976)).
302. 86 F.3d 191 (l1th Cir. 1996).
303. Id. at 191.

304. Id. at 192. The court of appeals declined to reconsider the substantive due process
disposition of McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en bane), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 898 (1995).

